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he Moral Economy of Cultural Identity
Tibet, Cultural Survival, and the Safeguarding of Cultural Heritage
Martin SAXER
Abstract: This paper takes as its starting point the conflicting claims about the present condition 
of Tibetan culture. While the Dalai Lama argues that a “cultural genocide” is going on in 
Tibet, the Chinese Party State emphasises its efforts to safeguard and promote Tibetan cultural 
heritage. Regardless of the different meanings the notion of “culture” adopts and the different 
agendas it serves, both sets of claims rely on a remarkably similar rhetoric, which couches 
cultural heritage not only in political or economic but also in moral terms. Both the “cultural 
genocide” thesis and the Party State’s alleged efforts to safeguard Tibetan culture are thereby 
enmeshed in the larger “ethico-politics” surrounding the “Tibet question” and the rise of China 
in the world. How to understand the fusion of the economic, the political, and the moral? What 
happens when the political economy of cultural identity (development, tourism, property and 
benefits) meets with the ethico-politics of cultural survival? I argue that a new form of moral 
economy has emerged at the conjuncture of “cultural survival” and “safeguarding cultural 
heritage” – a moral economy of cultural identity, similar in structure but different in form and 
style from the classical cases of moral economies.
Keywords: Tibet, cultural heritage, moral economy, identity, ethico-politics.
Résumé : Au Tibet, alors que le Dalai Lama dénonce un « génocide culturel » en cours, le 
Parti d’État chinois souligne ses efforts de sauvegarde et de promotion du patrimoine culturel 
tibétain. Partant de ces revendications conflictuelles relatives à la culture tibétaine, l’auteur 
montre que, au-delà des différentes significations de la notion de culture que ces revendications 
adoptent et des différents agendas qu’elle sert, ces discours se basent sur une rhétorique 
similaire mobilisant le patrimoine culturel en termes non seulement politiques et économiques, 
mais aussi moraux. À la fois la thèse du « génocide culturel » et  les efforts supposés du Parti 
d’État s’inscrivent dans l’éthique politique encadrant la plus large question du Tibet ainsi 
que celle de la montée en puissance de la Chine dans le monde. Comment comprendre cette 
fusion de l’économique, du politique et du moral ? Qu’arrive-t-il lorsque l’économie politique 
de l’identité culturelle (développement, tourisme, propriété et bénéfices) rencontre l’éthique 
politique de la survie du culturel ? L’auteur plaide pour une nouvelle forme d’économie morale 
située au point de rencontre de « la survie du culturel » et de la « sauvegarde du patrimoine 
culturel », une économie morale de l’identité culturelle partageant la même structure que les 
cas classiques d’économie morale mais non leur forme et leur style.
Mots-clés : Tibet, patrimoine culturel, économie morale, identité, éthique politique. 
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Over the centuries, Tibetan culture has remained a spiritual pillar for the Tibetan 
ethnic group. […] With great enthusiasm and a highly responsible attitude, […] 
the Chinese government has dedicated a large amount of manpower, materials 
and funds to the protection and promotion of ine traditional Tibetan culture. 
Information Ofice of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China1
Today, we are going through a critical period in time. We are a nation with an 
ancient culture, which is now facing the threat of extinction. We need your help, 
the international community’s help, to protect our culture.
The Dalai Lama2
In March 2008, the Tibetan capital of Lhasa erupted in a brief and sudden unrest. It 
started when a group of monks from Drepung monastery marched towards the centre 
of Lhasa on 10 March, the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising in 1959. They 
were stopped by police outside the city, and around ifty monks were arrested. On 14 
March, a small group of monks from the old Ramoche monastery in Lhasa’s busy city 
centre set out for a protest to demand their release. Again, they were soon stopped by 
police. This time, however, an angry Tibetan crowd sided with the monks and drove 
the police back.
The episode sparked a rebellious outburst. Over the following hours, Chinese 
immigrants and their businesses became victims of violent assaults, which left 
twenty-one people dead. Finally, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) moved in and 
gained control. The ensuing clamp-down caused an unknown number of Tibetan 
casualties,3 which were never oficially acknowledged. The events in Lhasa triggered 
unrest throughout the Tibetan world. In many places on the Tibetan Plateau, Tibetans 
took to the streets, displayed the banned Tibetan lag, shouted independence slogans, 
and demanded the return of the Dalai Lama (cf. Barnett 2008). 
For a few weeks, the unrest echoed in the global media space. It found its way 
onto the front pages of news magazines and was extensively covered by the 24-hour 
news channels. The Western media generally portrayed the riots in Lhasa and the 
ensuing unrest throughout the Tibetan inhabited areas of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) as an unfortunate but ultimately understandable reaction to ongoing 
repression by the Chinese state. It was argued that many Tibetans felt that they were 
being disadvantaged against Han Chinese immigrants. Meanwhile, Chinese television 
aired over and over again the same footage showing a Tibetan mob attacking Han 
residents in Lhasa. Chinese bloggers and commentators around the globe criticised 
the Western coverage for being inaccurate, pro-Tibetan, and ignoring the Chinese 
victims.
Oficial China was quick to name whom they regarded the obvious culprit: in best 
party jargon Premier Wen Jiabao made the “Dalai clique” responsible for master-
minding the unrest (cf. CNN 2008). On 16 March 2008, the Dalai Lama refuted these 
1 (IOSC 2008: 2f).
2 [http://www.tibetanarts.org/index.html]
3 See [www.tibetinfonet.net/newsticker/entries] for a comprehensive list of reports, eye-witness 
accounts, and death toll estimates.
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claims and said that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, “some kind of cultural 
genocide” was taking place in Tibet (Eimer and Chamberlain 2008). The Dalai Lama 
has reiterated the cultural genocide thesis several times since 2008, including in a 
CNN-IBN interview with Karan Thapar in November 2010.4
Although allegations of cultural genocide can be traced back in exile discourse to 
the early 1960s (Sautman 2003: 196), they have gained new relevance in the light of 
the Party State’s latest turn in its Tibet strategy. While earlier positions predominantly 
highlighted development and progress in order legitimise the Party State’s policies, 
the Party State has recently begun to emphasise its efforts to promote and protect the 
“ine traditional Tibetan culture” as heritage.
Two government white papers published in 2001 and 2008 illustrate this remarkable 
shift in oficial Chinese discourse on Tibet. The 2001 white paper is entitled Tibet’s 
March Toward Modernization (IOSC 2001) and argues for a “historical inevitability” 
to modernise Tibet. It underscores the region’s rapid social development and lists 
Tibet’s modernisation achievements. 
This line of argument has not lost any of its importance. However, a rhetoric of 
safeguarding traditional Tibetan culture is now being carefully superimposed onto 
this erstwhile purely modernist discourse. In September 2008, a white paper entitled 
Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture was published. It was explicitly meant 
to “expose the lie of the ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet fabricated by the 14th Dalai Lama 
and his cohorts” and to “give the international community a better understanding of the 
reality of the protection and development of Tibetan culture” (IOSC 2008: 3). It does 
so by enumerating China’s efforts to preserve Tibet’s cultural heritage, including the 
reconstruction of monasteries, the promotion and development of Tibetan medicine, 
the oficial guarantee for religious freedom, and the increasing numbers of books, 
newspapers and TV programmes in Tibetan language.5
In other words, the Party State no longer seems to count on the idea that accelerated 
development is the answer to all woes in Tibet. It has begun to cast its own vision 
of authentic Tibetan culture against the cultural genocide thesis. As the Party State 
in taking on the cultural genocide allegations and actively engages in this formerly 
exile-dominated ield, cultural identity – as difference, as dissent, or as heritage – has 
emerged as the predominant arena of the “Tibet question”.
I do not intend to substantiate or refute either the Tibetan Government in Exile’s 
claims or those by the Chinese Party State. My aim is not to discuss whether the 
cultural genocide thesis is justiied or not.6 Instead, I intend to show how the two are 
entangled. Both the “cultural genocide” thesis and the Party State’s alleged efforts 
4 Aired on 21 November 2010, 8 p.m.
5 Unlike the Dalai Lama’s statement about cultural genocide, the White Paper largely went unnoticed 
outside China. A year later, however, the Central Tibetan Administration (the Tibetan Government 
in Exile) answered with their own White Paper, entitled China’s attempts to wipe out the language 
and culture of Tibet (DIIR 2009), which controverted the Chinese claims.
6 For a discussion of whether a cultural genocide is really happening see Sautman (2003; 2006) as 
well as Blondeau and Buffetrille’s Authenticating Tibet: answers to China’s 100 questions(2008), 
especially the responses by Barnett (question 22), Blondeau, Heller and Meyer (questions 68-75).
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to safeguard Tibetan culture are enmeshed in the larger “ethico-politics” (Rose 
1999: 173, 188-196) surrounding the political spectacle of the Tibet question and 
the rise of China in the world. Both positions rely on a common discursive strategy: 
Tibet’s ancient culture has to be safeguarded, and the international community should 
understand the “reality” of what is going on. 
Of course, Tibetan activists and the Chinese Communist Party have different 
visions of what makes Tibetan culture unique and what should be safe-guarded as 
heritage, and these may differ substantially form anthropological understandings of 
culture. It is precisely this vagueness of the terms “culture” and “heritage” from which 
they derive their power: it enables them to accommodate different agendas. 
In the present case, the notion of cultural heritage serves three distinctive purposes. 
First, it legitimises political claims on both sides: more development to safeguard 
Tibetan culture versus less interference to protect its remains. Second, it positions 
culture as a moral question: the “threat of extinction”, the “spiritual pillar”. And third, 
cultural heritage produces economic value: it is a crucial aspect in Tibet’s development 
as a destination for (mainly domestic) mass tourism. 
How to understand the fusion of the political, the moral, and the economic? What 
happens when the political economy of cultural identity (development, tourism, 
property and beneits) meets with the ethico-politics of cultural survival? 
These are the questions I seek to address. I argue that at the conjuncture of “cultural 
survival” and “safeguarding cultural heritage” a new form of moral economy has 
emerged – a moral economy of cultural identity.
Moral Economy, revisited
The term “moral economy” requires closer examination. Of course, every 
economy, including the global market economy, is arguably moral in the sense that 
it is embedded in a certain set of ethics (Booth 1994). Thus, the concept of “moral 
economy” could also be described as a moralised political economy. However, doing 
so would not bring any analytical beneit.
“Moral economy” draws on a long debate in anthropology and political science. 
Karl Polanyi showed in his seminal book The Great Transformation (Polanyi 1957) 
that industrial capitalism and market economy encountered forms of “embedded 
economies”, which cannot be understood in terms of Homo oeconomicus’ striving 
to maximise proit. Community and morality have to be taken into account. E. P. 
Thomson subsequently used the term “moral economy” for his inquiry into the 18th 
century food riots in Great Britain (Thompson 1971), where exponents of the emerging 
capitalist society, such as millers and bakers, were accused by the rural poor on moral 
grounds. The poor couched their grievances against illegitimate capitalist practices 
in notions based upon widely-held traditional views of obligations and social norms 
(ibid.: 79). 
Finally, James Scott took the concept beyond Europe in his book The Moral 
Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (1976). He 
argues that the Burmese and Vietnamese peasantry responded to being incorporated 
in more implacable state rule and a larger market economy by revivifying moral 
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understandings of minimal subsistence rights. This “subsistence ethic”, when under 
attack, triggers a “relex of self-protection” (Scott 2005: 397).
Contemporary Tibet is neither an “embedded economy” nor a peasant society, and 
the Tibetan unrest in 2008 was not a food riot (although the hike in food prices may 
have played a role). The moral economy I am suggesting here is different in form 
and scale from the phenomena described by Polanyi, Thompson and Scott; yet, it is 
similar in structure.
Thompson describes the moral economy as confrontation in a rapidly transforming 
market-place. In the context of the early 21st century the increasing pervasiveness 
of the market economy still creates friction and triggers resistance. In the present 
case, however, the economic good is not grain or livestock but cultural identity reiied 
or “protected” as heritage. The subsistence crisis is not material but cultural. Yet, 
as the cultural genocide thesis suggests, this cultural subsistence crises is equally 
experienced and expressed as a question of survival. What is nearing extinction, 
according to the Dalai Lama, is “the religion, culture, language and identity, which 
successive generations of Tibetans have considered more precious than their lives” 
(Wong 2009).
Apart from the difference in goods at stake, there is a difference in space. The 
site of confrontation is no longer bound to a speciic market-place as in Thompson’s 
case. The unrest in Lhasa not only spread across the Plateau, it also triggered pro- and 
anti-Tibetan demonstrations around the globe. Following Edelman, one can say that 
Thompson’s “market-place” as site of confrontation has lost its “place” (Edelman 
2005: 332). Tibetanness is a global good enmeshed in global debates about morality 
and politics. Confrontations in this global market without place naturally take a 
different shape.
Despite these differences in form and scale, the notion of “moral economy” 
suggests itself for the present case because it highlights a tension that is similar to the 
one described in the classical moral economy scholarship: the extension of the market 
economy and its logic (investment, price, proit) to a domain considered critical for 
subsistence meets with political resistance couched in moral terms and experienced 
as moral problem.
Revival of “Culture”
In order to understand the making of this new moral economy of cultural identity 
we irst have to look at the context in which Tibetan culture has gained economic 
value and has become a candidate for the creation of heritage.
Today, as we have seen, the Party State portrays itself not only as bringing the 
comforts of modern life to Tibet but also as the respectful steward and guardian of 
authentic Tibetan culture (IOSC 2008: 2). While this may sound cynical to many 
a Tibetan ear, it hints at the speciic historical conjuncture in which Tibetanness 
has acquired economic value in the People’s Republic. The rise of an economy of 
Tibetanness has to be seen in relation to the generally positive view of cultural heritage 
in contemporary China. This, of course, has not always been the case. The positive 
notion of cultural heritage and tradition stands in stark contrast to the hostility against 
“old traditions” that characterised the Mao era. Ann Anagnost (1997: 75ff) argues 
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that in the course of the post-Mao reforms the notions of class and class struggle as 
organising igures of a national imaginary were gradually pushed aside by the notion 
of wenming, “civilisation” or “civility”.
Wenming covers a range of meanings. It can denote Chinese civilisation 
(zhongguo wenming) as the nation’s glorious past, but also a dreamed-of “modernity” 
(xiandaihua). The notion of wenming, Anagnost argues, “encapsulates what has been 
called the ‘Janus-facedness’ of the national imaginary, looking toward the past to face 
the future” (1997).
Whereas revolutionary discourse portrayed the past as something to be overcome 
at all cost in order to create a better future, the post-Mao reform period has been 
characterised by a multifaceted relection on wenming and its relation to wenhua – 
culture. It was questioned, for example, whether Chinese culture was responsible for 
the country’s “backward” status in the global community or whether wenhua, on the 
contrary, was the key to economic success and the new rise of China in the world; 
or whether the revival of Confucianism might serve as the basis for an alternative 
modernity (Dirlik 1995; Ong 1996; Wei-ming 1996; Shue 2006; DuBois 2010: 354ff).
The demise of class and the rise of culture and civilisation as guiding notions of 
political discourse had a direct impact on China’s ethnic minorities. The People’s 
Republic oficially encompasses ifty-six nationalities (minzu) – including the Han 
majority. This inclusion, Dru Gladney (2004: 35) remarks, points to the fact that 
the notion of minzu is intimately connected with the construction of China as a 
harmonious, orderly, civilised, multi-minzu family. Very often, the ifty-ive minorities 
are presented, or actively present themselves, as “living ancestors” that provide a 
glimpse into the Han majority’s own past, as living fossils of ancient times (Oakes 
1998: 188; Oakes 2000: 681; Scott 2009: ix).
Together with rising household incomes and a burgeoning domestic tourism 
industry, cultural and “ethnic” destinations have seen an unprecedented boom over 
the last two decades. The new interest in the past has led to the extensive construction 
of “old towns” and theme parks throughout the country (Anagnost 1997: 161-176; 
Oakes 1998: 42-59; Gladney 2004: 32-48). Tim Oakes speaks in this respect of a 
veritable manufacturing of minzu culture (Oakes 1998: 140ff). On the one hand, 
the preservation of culture provides both the “ideological glue to build a national 
community” and a means for minorities to participate in this ethico-political project; 
on the other hand, the preservation of culture is pursued in the name of economic 
development and rural poverty alleviation.
Intangible Cultural Heritage and the Market for Tibetanness
The use of ethnic identity for commercial purposes is, of course, by no means 
a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. Over the last two decades, “identity economies” 
and “ethnicity industries” have emerged around the globe (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2009). The fusion of cultural preservation and economic interests, as explicitly put 
forward in the white paper Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (IOSC 
2008), is therefore not the Party State’s invention. It ties in with UNESCO’s concept 
of “intangible cultural heritage”, which has become a centrepiece in the organisation’s 
strategy. Unlike UNESCO’s previous emphasis on identifying and protecting world 
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heritage sites, this new approach extends the UNESCO strategy into the domain 
of non-material expressions of culture. In 2003, the UNESCO conference in Paris 
adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
(UNESCO 2003) and China was among the irst countries to ratify it in 2004. The 
convention deines intangible cultural heritage as
the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the 
instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their 
cultural heritage. (ibid.: Art. 2.1)
As the convention’s title suggests, this intangible cultural heritage needs to be 
safeguarded. Safeguarding includes:
measures aimed at ensuring the viability of the intangible cultural heritage, 
including the identiication, documentation, research, preservation, protection, 
promotion, enhancement, transmission, particularly through formal and non-
formal education, as well as the revitalization of the various aspects of such 
heritage. (ibid.: Art. 2.3)
research, and protection but also for promotion, enhancement, and transmission 
of cultural heritage, falls perfectly in line with the approaches adopted by the PRC to 
protect as well as promote and develop cultural heritage. It ties in with older modes of 
protecting tangible cultural heritage, such as the Potala palace or the Jokhang temple in 
Lhasa, but widens its scope considerably.7 China has set up and is steadily expanding 
a catalogue of its intangible cultural heritage. In the case of Tibet, committees were 
established in the TAR and the Tibetan prefectures in other provinces to investigate 
and identify suitable items for the list. Sixty-one Tibetan “reference works”, including 
the Gesar Epic, thirty-one eminent people, The fact that the convention not only calls 
for identiication, documentation, and several Tibetan medicines have since been 
listed (IOSC 2008: 11).
Thus, the notion of safeguarding cultural heritage has reached Tibet in combination 
with development targets, ethnic tourism, and an ongoing fascination for minzu culture. 
A case in point in the town and county of Gyalthang (or Zhongdian in Chinese), 
located in Yunnan province. It was oficially renamed Shangri-La in 2001. Awarding 
the place the oficial name of James Hilton’s hidden paradise8 promised to promote 
tourism in the region (Maconi 2007; Kolås 2008: 11ff). The airport nearby and the 
local Tibetan medicine factory inherited the precious brand. The main road has been 
substantially improved and now provides easy access for tour groups. 
Other Tibetan examples of ethnic tourist destinations include the famous “nine 
villages” – Dzitsa Degu or Jiuzhaigou – in Ngaba prefecture (Sichuan Province) with 
an estimated three million mostly domestic visitors per year (DIIR 2007: 205), as 
7 See Shepherd (2006) for the politics that surrounded the cultural protection of the Potala palace in 
Lhasa.
8 The term Shangri-La was coined by James Hilton in his famous novel Lost Horizon (1933) to 
denote a hidden paradise somewhere in Tibet. Shangri-La has ever since fuelled mystical images 
of Tibet and has served as a name for countless hotels and businesses throughout the Himalayas.
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well as an increasing number of smaller theme park-style sites throughout Tibet. In 
Lhasa, the construction of an “intangible cultural heritage park” has recently started. 
With a planned reception capacity of 800,000 visitors per year and 1000 staff, the park 
is envisioned to become “the largest scale one-stop comprehensive cultural tourism 
destination in Lhasa” once is has been completed in 2014 (CTIC 2010).
The booming interest in minorities, including their tourism potential, has given 
rise to a pronounced shift in how Tibet is being conceived in China. The images 
of barbarian customs, feudal cruelty, and a general backwardness that dominated 
the discourse of Maoist liberation (cf. Heberer 2001) have given way to much more 
positive images of Tibet as a realm of unspoilt nature and as a “lustrous pearl of 
Chinese culture” (IOSC 2008: 2).
Shoton, Inc.
Building the stage for Lhasa’s Shoton festival’s opening ceremony, August 2009.  
The festival is listed as “intangible cultural heritage” since 2006.
© Martin Saxer 2009.
An example to illustrate this fusion of preservation and promotion is Shoton (sho 
ston), the Yoghurt festival in Lhasa. The name Shoton derives from the custom of 
serving yoghurt to the monks of Drepung monastery coming back from their summer 
retreat. The festival starts with a spectacular ceremony at Drepung monastery, in which 
a huge thanka is unrolled. Shoton draws tens of thousands of Tibetans to Drepung and, 
over the subsequent days, to the Norbulinka (the summer palace) where performances 
of ache lhamo (Tibetan opera) are shown.9
9 For two theories about the origin of Shoton see [www.tibetanarts.org/events_shoton.html]. See 
Richardson 1993 for a description of the festival and Henrion-Dourcy 2012 for a discussion of ache 
lhamo.
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Shoton was listed as intangible cultural heritage in 2006 (CIECC 2006), the same 
year as the railway link to Lhasa was inaugurated. The festival, which usually falls in 
August, has become a major tourist event and an important stage on which to promote 
Tibet. Business promotion events during Shoton 2007 were said to have attracted 7.51 
billion yuan of investment for forty-one different projects in the TAR, ranging from 
tourism to Tibetan medicine, science and traditional crafts (Peng 2007). 
As a strategy of branding, festival mascots (clearly inspired by the Beijing 
Olympic mascots) and a logo were designed. The logo depicts a masked Tibetan 
dancer, a lower-festooned Tibetan girl holding a cup of Yoghurt, and two black yaks 
with conspicuously red lips. In 2009, the government news agency Xinhua announced 
that a ritual exchange of mascots between Shoton and the Shanghai World Expo 2010 
took place (Xinhua 2009a). Within a few years, Shoton was transformed from just a 
Tibetan festival, tolerated by the authorities but without any strategic relevance, into a 
branded and protected key event for tourism and business promotion in Tibet.
The thanka ceremony at Drepung monastery during Shoton 2009.
© Martin Saxer 2009.
This commodiication and branding of “cultural heritage” may be seen as just an 
extension of capitalist commodity fetishisation to the domain of ethnicity. However, 
Jean and John Comaroff suggest that the commodiication and marketisation of 
ethnic identity tend to yield more complex outcomes. In their book Ethnicity, Inc. 
(2009), they argue that the market for cultural identity also creates unprecedented 
opportunities for generating value of various kinds – not only for the well-positioned. 
Following Chambers (2000), Swain (1990), Geismar (2005), Xie (2003) and others, 
the Comaroffs contend that any number of minority populations around the globe have 
“enhanced their autonomy, their political presence, and their material circumstances 
by adroitly managing their tourist potential – and all that it has come to connote” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009: 24). In short, the moniker “Ethnicity, Inc.” can stand 
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for both unfettered exploitation and tactical “ethno-preneuralism” (ibid.: 27) serving 
local economic and political agendas.
The Comaroffs’ thesis raises a set of questions in relation to Tibet: What remains 
of the “cultural genocide” if and when Tibetans themselves engage as entrepreneurs 
of their ethnic identity, or when becoming an ethnic tourist dancer trained in Beijing is 
a career perspective for a Tibetan university graduate? What, when “cultural survival 
[…] has given way, in many places, to survival through culture”, as the Comaroffs 
put it (2009)?
Here, two issues intersect. The notion of “cultural survival” emphasises the 
question: is it authentic? “Survival through culture”, on the other hand, foregrounds 
the question: who proits? Thus, possible outcomes at this intersection fall somewhere 
between “all fake and others proit” and “authentic and economically beneicial for 
local stakeholders” – with many shades and combinations in between. 
In the case of Tibet, one end of this spectrum is marked, for example, by an exhibition 
on Tibetan medicine in the Tibetan medical college in Lhasa, which had just closed it 
doors when I started my ield research in September 2007. The exhibition, however, 
had stirred so much anger that it kept coming up in conversations. Pieced together 
from several accounts this is approximately what happened: a Chinese entrepreneur 
had rented a space in the college for an exhibition on Tibetan medicine, tailored 
to Chinese as well as Western tour groups. The exhibition was actively advertised. 
Visitors to Lhasa were issued with appropriate lealets on arrival at the airport; travel 
agents received a inancial incentive for every person they brought to the premises. 
Tibetan medicine, in one form or the other, features on standard tour programmes of 
most travel agencies, and the exhibition attracted a huge number of people. 
“During summer the college looked like a tourist place”, a former student at the 
Medical College told me. He used to work as a guide in the exhibition. One day he 
had a Portuguese tour group:
That day, the wife of the Chinese entrepreneur who ran the exhibition was 
also present. She insisted on doing most of the talking. But as she was not 
very knowledgeable about Sowa Rigpa [the Tibetan Science of Healing], I 
sometimes added my thoughts when the things she said were not accurate. Of 
course, she did not like that at all. At the end of the tour the tourists were always 
supposed to buy herbs. There was a cabinet with a Tibetan doctor who, in fact, 
was Chinese and not Tibetan at all. I tried to speak with him in Tibetan but he 
did not understand. There was an elderly man in my group. He was advised to 
buy some yartsagunbu10 to tackle his weight problem. But yartsagunbu is not 
good for overweight people! So I intervened again. The leader’s wife got very 
angry and told me to mind my own business. A very unfortunate experience.
The exhibition caused widespread anger and a feeling that a Chinese entrepreneur 
was capitalising on the Tibetan heritage. Students and teachers were utterly upset 
about the whole affair and launched a complaint to the relevant government ofice. 
10 Yartsagunbu (dbyar rtswa dgun ‘bu) or Ophiocordyceps sinensis is a caterpillar fungus famous as a 
general tonic and said to possess a virility-boosting effect (see Winkler 2005; 2008; 2010; Olsgard 
2009; Sulek 2009).
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It was argued that having a fake Tibetan doctor was not helping the cause of Tibetan 
medicine. Apparently, they were told not to speak about the issue. However, when the 
entrepreneur’s contract ran out it was not renewed and the exhibition closed.
Another case in point is a disenfranchised group of Tibetan nomads on the shores 
of Qinghai Lake, as recently portrayed in a documentary by the acclaimed Tibetan 
ilmmaker Dorje Tsering Chenaktsang. The nomads live near an ethnic tourist village 
and the ilm shows the grim side of theme park culture: Chinese tourists enjoy 
themselves riding yaks and taking pictures of beautifully dressed Tibetan nomad girls, 
who earn one yuan per photo. The owners of the site, however, have started charging 
increasingly high “entrance fees” for the Tibetans “working” inside the fenced area 
– an area which above all was illegally established on the sacred communal land 
of the local nomads. When the Tibetans raised their voice against these issues their 
settlement was raided and their leaders imprisoned.
While such examples are abundant, there is also another reality that causes less 
of a stir. On the other end of the spectrum, stories of Tibetans successfully competing 
against Chinese businessmen and clearly proiting from the Tibetanness economy 
can easily be found. They include Tibetan travel agents in Shangri-la, for example, 
who have seen their businesses take off since the renaming of the town and county 
triggered infrastructure developments and an increasing inlux of tourists, Tibetan 
hotel owners in Lhasa who directly proit from the new railway that links Mainland 
China to the TAR, or Tibetan shareholders of successful Tibetan medicine companies 
now producing for a nationwide market.
Many of these successful Tibetans are not only clever business people; they also 
make active use of the space that the oficial strategy of cultural preservation has 
created. Adopting the traditional role of a jindak (sbyin bdag) – a patron or sponsor 
– in Tibetan society, they support monasteries, build clinics, organise free health 
camps in remote areas, fund local schools and sponsor local festivals. In short, trying 
to balance proit with altruism, many successful Tibetans engage in activities with no 
direct economic gain, simply because such activities are considered to be important 
for Tibetan culture. Here, economic value is being transformed back into moral and 
spiritual value. Here, the “ethnicity industry” is understood and practiced as a moral 
economy in a positive sense – an economy that creates a space for local Tibetan 
initiatives. 
The Moral Economy at Large
The problem is, however, that besides being an important aspect of Tibetan self-
understanding, the moral and spiritual value of Tibetanness is also intrinsically linked 
to the global political spectacle (Debord 1970; McLagan 2002) that surrounds the 
political status of Tibet and China’s rise in the world. 
In an insightful report titled Brand China, Joshua Cooper Ramo (2007) shows that 
China’s image of herself and other nations’ views of her are increasingly diverging. 
While Chinese have seen their country rapidly changing and their views account 
for the resulting ambivalences, in the eyes of the world China is often thought of as 
simultaneously humiliated and arrogant, while seeking to regain its status as world 
power at all cost. Ramo argues that “China’s greatest strategic threat today is its 
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national image” and that “for a nation obsessed about territorial sovereignty, China 
has let its ‘image sovereignty’ slip out of its control” (ibid.: 12f). Image sovereignty, 
however, is a matter of trust and Ramo notes that “until China becomes a more trusted 
nation, making her a more understood nation is a dificult task” (ibid.: 17). 
“Cultural genocide”, the idea that Tibet’s cultural survival is threatened by 
government-sponsored Chinese encroachment, has become a major stumbling block 
in this respect. Western politicians meeting Chinese leaders are under constant public 
vigilance at home whether they show enough courage to admonish the latter for human 
rights violations. The “cultural subsistence crisis” has taken centre stage on a global 
scale. The protection of Tibetan cultural heritage is no longer primarily a question of 
tourism development or the concept of a harmonious family of multi-minzu China; it 
is directly tied to the problem of China’s reputation in the world.
The 2008 Beijing Olympics were regarded a prime opportunity to mark the dawning 
of a new era in the PRC’s international relations by showing the world the “real” face 
of China. With the unrest in Tibet and the Party State’s response to it, showing the 
“real face” proved to be an uphill battle. One episode during the Games’ opening 
ceremony highlights the problem particularly well: a choir of ifty-six children, one 
from each minzu, performed a song together, a display of unity and harmony. Later, 
the Western media found out that actually all the children were Han Chinese. The 
responsible oficial’s reaction in a television interview was simple and reasonable: 
“It was a show”, he said – a show for which the best performers were selected. The 
children were cast as actors; they were playing a role. They were not meant to be 
representatives of the ifty-six nationalities, but a representation of the ideal of multi-
ethnic China as a harmonious family.
 The Western media, however, ignored the show’s nature as performance and used 
the episode as evidence that China’s charm offensive was nothing but propaganda, and 
that in reality there was no harmony in China. Tibet, and to a lesser extent Xinjiang, 
often serve as the focal points of this much larger symbolic and moral struggle between 
rising China and the West. 
As Tibetan cultural identity is enmeshed in these larger issues of China’s envisioned 
new role in the world and the scepticism against it, the moral economy of Tibetanness 
it is necessarily a moral economy at large.
Resisting Heritage
It is this context in which a new form of civil disobedience has emerged in Tibet. 
It started already before the unrest of March 2008. In 2006, following an appeal by 
the Dalai Lama to stop wearing the traditional fur-trimmed festive clothes, for which 
traditionally tiger, leopard, lynx, otter, or fox pelts are used, people throughout Tibet 
gathered to burn their burn their exquisite fur-trimmed robes. The authorities regarded 
this as an act of deiance – regardless of the fact that the Dalai Lama’s appeal was 
very much in conformity with the PRC’s wildlife protection laws already in place. 
In 2007, people in Yushu were even ordered to wear their fur-trimmed robes for the 
annual horse-racing festival, which had become a tourist attraction. Not dressing 
traditionally Tibetan meant being ined up to 3,000 yuan (Environment News Service 
2006; Macartney 2007).
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The igure of “resisting culture” became even more pronounced in 2009 during 
the losar festival. Many Tibetans refused to celebrate losar (lo sar), the Tibetan New 
Year, as a silent protest against the current situation. This performance of Tibetanness 
by not celebrating the most important Tibetan festival of the year came to be seen as a 
threatening act of civil disobedience. Woeser, a Tibetan writer known for her courage 
and outspokenness, wrote on 24 February 2009: 
“Not to celebrate Losar” has been regarded as a serious “separatist” activity, 
so much so that some Tibetans have been accused of spreading “not to celebrate 
Losar” rumours and been arrested. (Woeser 2009)
Oficial China blamed the matter on the “Dalai clique” and the Tibetan Youth 
Congress (TYC). The TYC had labelled 2009 a black year and had issued a call to join 
the Tibetans in Tibet in not celebrating losar(TYC 2009). Chinese government new 
agency Xinhua cited a senior Tibetan astrologer to prove the Tibetan Youth Congress 
wrong. Gongkar Rigzin, a 1957 graduate of the Lhasa Mentsikhang (the institute of 
Tibetan medicine and astrology) had been responsible for its calendar calculations for 
over thirty years. He was quoted as saying that the coming year was by no means black 
but red, which was a sign that it would be “festive and auspicious, but dry”(Xinhua 
2009b).
In short, while the Tibetans in Tibet refuse to play Tibetan, China’s government 
news agency cites a Tibetan expert to tell them that they are wrong and that one should 
not “‘play politics’ with Tibetan culture” (ibid.) – a remarkable development, given 
the Party’s history in ighting backward superstition. Now, Tibetan astrology is used 
to create a moral truth about authentic Tibetanness. To make the argument even more 
persuasive, the voice of the market was summoned: It was claimed that Gongkar 
Rigzin’s calendar sold more than 100,000 copies per year, many of them in Nepal and 
India.
A few months earlier, delivering a lecture at the Indian Institute of Management 
in Ahmedabad, the Dalai Lama claimed to be a Marxist monk, “because unlike 
capitalism, Marxism is more ethical” (Express News Service 2008). As one of the 
examples, not of Marxist ethics, but of ruthless capitalist exploitation, he cited – 
the People’s Republic of China. Just as the Party State has started criticising and 
even ining Tibetans for not being authentically Tibetan, the Dalai Lama blames the 
Chinese leadership for not being authentically communist.
In this context, communism is no longer bad (because anti-religious) per se, and 
Tibetan culture no longer backward. As long as one is an authentic Communist or an 
authentic Tibetan, both can be good and honourable. As authenticity is a crucial asset 
in the moral economy of cultural identity, its creation, maintenance, and defence are 
logical strategies. Thus, both the emphasis on cultural survival (instead of political 
independence) and the prominence of safeguarding Tibetan cultural heritage in 





In summary, two threads come together to produce what I have described as a new 
form of moral economy – the moral economy of cultural identity.
The irst thread represents the fusion of ethnic culture and commerce. In the context 
of the rising interest for ethnicity and culture in post-Mao China, Tibetanness acquired 
economic value. The advent of mass tourism with the opening of a railway link to 
Lhasa in 2006 further fuelled the emergence of a veritable Tibetanness economy. 
The second thread fuses cultural identity with global politics and morality. In the 
run-up to the Beijing Olympic Games 2008 China started pushing more actively for 
a re-deinition of its role in the global sphere. This push is relected in the notion of 
China’s peaceful rise and the attempt to show a new face to the world. The cultural 
genocide allegations gained new relevance in this context and the Party State began 
to emphasise its efforts in protecting Tibetan culture. However, doing so also means 
agreeing to put the fate of Tibetan cultural identity right at the core of the political 
debate, which is precisely what the exile notion of “cultural survival” postulates. In 
other words, paraphrasing Xinhua, the name of the game is now, indeed, “playing 
politics with Tibetan culture”.
What facilitates the entanglement of these two threads is the concept of heritage 
– or, more precisely: the extension of heritage to the domain of the intangible as put 
forward in the UNESCO convention on The Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage. For the Party State, the concept offers a globally accepted and ethically 
“certiied” answer to both the cultural genocide allegations as well as the problem of 
combining the protection of “ine traditional Tibetan culture” (IOSC 2008: 3) with 
accelerated development. 
However, as the movement against celebrating certain Tibetan festivals shows, 
the concept as it is applied in China fails to capture the nuances of morality and 
the luidness of cultural identity. Precisely because the notion of heritage entangles 
culture and commerce with politics and morality, and because the Party State has 
started playing in this ield formerly dominated by exile discourse, notions of what is 
considered morally right and authentically Tibetan simply moved on. Making market 
rules for a moral economy of intangible goods is not as easy as the notion of heritage 
led some to believe. 
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